Seminole County Bail Bonds – State Can Limit Gold Mining Despite 19th Century Law

Source     : kcet News
By            : Chris Clarke
Category : Seminole County Bail Bonds , Bail Bondsman in Sanford

State Can Limit Gold Mining Despite 19th Century Law

The California Supreme Court last week affirmed the state’s right to protect its streams and lakes from mining pollution, and set limits on one of the nation’s most controversial laws in the process. In its August 22 decision, the Court found that the federal Mining Law of 1872 doesn’t prevent the California state government from regulating mining on federal land. That’s a blow to recreational mining advocates who often cite the 1872 law as protecting their right to extract minerals from public lands without government oversight. The basics of the court case are fairly straightforward. On June 16, 2012, a California game warden found Brandon Lance Rinehart using suction dredging equipment on an unpatented placer mining claim on public land in the Plumas National Forest. Rinehart didn’t have a permit from the California Department of Fish and Game (now Fish and Wildlife) to either use that equipment or possess it in a closed area, and he was cited for two misdemeanors as a result. Suction dredging is a process in which sediment is essentially vacuumed from a creek or riverbed, run through sluices to allow gold and other heavier sediment to settle out, then dumped back into the stream. The process can create serious problems for wildlife that live in the water, posing a special threat to salmon and trout that require gravel beds for spawning. The lighter sediment released by suction dredging can bury those gravels, rendering entire stretches of streambed unsuitable as spawning habitat.

Suction dredging also releases the heavy metal mercury from those sediments, which poses risks to both wildlife and people downstream. It would have been hard for Rinehart to get a permit for suction dredging that stretch of creek in the Plumas: The California Department of Fish and Wildlife hasn’t issued any since 2009, when it issued a temporary moratorium on new suction dredging permits. The moratorium was put in place to give the state time to come up with a regulatory process that allowed some dredging while protecting salmon and limiting mercury pollution. Though that moratorium was originally set to expire this June, the Legislature removed that deadline when it became clear that more study was needed about which state agency had the authority to regulate streambed mining. The moratorium is still in place. Rinehart chose to fight the citation in court, contending that the state of California had no authority to restrict suction dredge mining on federal land. He claimed that the federal Mining Law of 1872 protected the right of prospectors and miners to operate without interference on federal land, and that the suction dredge moratorium deprived him of the only economically feasible method for extracting gold from his claim. The Mining Law of 1872, also known as the General Mining act of 1872, is one of the most controversial environmental laws currently on the American books. Written in a time of westward settlement, in which the federal government sought to foster extractive industries throughout the West, as a way of consolidating control of the land and encouraging further settlement. The law allows any U.S. citizen 18 years or older to stake a mining claim on federal land, and limits the cost of making that claim to $5.00 per acre, a price still in effect that was set in 1872. Under the Mining Law, miners are not obliged to pay royalties on any metals mined from public land, a considerable loss to the Treasury given the estimated $2 billion to $3 billion in minerals extracted from public lands each year.

A few laws passed since 1872, notably the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, which added a few common-sense requirements to the process of mining on public lands, including a requirement that miners pay for site reclamation once their mining activities are completed. But overall, the Mining Law of 1872 stands as a quintessential piece of Libertarian legislation, and it has left more than a century of toxic environmental disasters in its wake. It’s also a favorite of anti-environmental activists such as the Pacific Legal Foundation, which maintains that the Law “preempts” —  overrides — any state or local laws that would mean tougher regulation of mining on federal land. That’s the argument that Rinehart brought to court with him. He didn’t deny that he’d been suction dredging without permits: he claimed that the Mining Law of 1872, by preempting California law, meant he didn’t legally need the permits.  The trial court didn’t buy Rinehart’s argument, ruled it inadmissible, and sentenced him to three years’ probation in 2013. Rinehart appealed. The Appeals court found some merit in his argument that California’s de facto ban on suction dredge mining was an improper infringement on miners’ rights, and that the Mining Law may in fact preempt the state’s power to regulate mining. The Appeals court remanded the case back to the trial court in October 2014, ordering that court to give a full hearing to Rinehart’s original argument.

The state of California asked the state Supreme Court to review the Appeals Court’s decision, and last week’s ruling was the result.

The Supreme Court ruled that the Mining Law was never intended to preempt a state’s power to regulate mining within its borders:
We conclude the state’s moratorium is not preempted. The federal laws Rinehart relies upon reflect a congressional intent to afford prospectors secure possession of, and in some instances title to, the places they mine. But while Congress sought to protect miners’ real property interests, it did not go further and guarantee to them a right to mine immunized from exercises of the states’ police powers.

The California Supreme Court had some formidable backup in reaching this decision:
the very same federal government whose Mining Law Rinehart claimed preempts California regulations.

The U.S. Department of Justice weighed in on the case in an Amicus brief, saying:
The Mining Law of 1872 does not expressly preempt state environmental regulation of mining activities on federal lands, and Congress has never intended for all such regulation to be preempted… The Mining Law of 1872 expressly requires compliance with all state and local laws that do not conflict with federal law. And so the matter stands. The right of the state of California to make sure public lands mining doesn’t endanger the environment or public health has been bolstered, and the California Supreme Court’s ruling may well influence similar decisions in other states as well. It’s an interesting full circle for California state environmental law, given that miners inspired some of California’s very first environmental laws by washing huge volumes of sediment downstream in their search for gold in the mid-19th Century. Just 12 years after Congress passed the Mining Law of 1872, federal judge Lorenzo Sawyer ruled in San Francisco that hydraulic mining, in which entire hillsides were washed downstream by huge, high-pressure jets of water, was too damaging to the environment to be allowed to continue. It was a landmark decision at the dawn of California environmental law, and Sawyer’s 21st Century counterparts on the California Supreme Court would seem to be continuing his work.

Read More : kcet.org/redefine/court-state-can-limit-gold-mining-despite-19th-century-law

Bail Bond Seminole County – A Legal Barrier to Higher Interest Rates

Source     : Wall Street Journal
By            : George Selgin
Category : Bail Bond Seminole County , Bail Bondsman in Sanford

A Legal Barrier to Higher Interest Rates

Defending the Federal Reserve’s recent decision to put off raising interest rates again, Fed Chair Janet Yellen told reporters last week that she and other Fed governors wanted “to see some continued progress” before taking that step. Politics, she insisted, had nothing to do with it. What Ms. Yellen didn’t say is that the Fed couldn’t raise its rates without breaking the law. Since when are Fed rate increases illegal? Since the 2007-08 subprime meltdown and financial disaster, actually. Until then the Fed could set any target it liked for the federal-funds rate—the interest rate banks pay for overnight loans of cash reserves. To keep the fed-funds rate from rising above target, the Fed pumped more reserves into the banking system. To keep it from dropping below, it took reserves away. But after Lehman Brothers failed in 2008, the Fed’s efforts to keep the fed-funds rate from dropping below its target proved futile. To set a floor on how far the rate could go, the Fed started paying interest on banks’ reserve balances with the Fed, taking advantage of the 2006 Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act giving it permission to do so.

Alas, it didn’t work. Government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks, which also kept deposit balances at the Fed but weren’t eligible for interest on reserves (IOR), started making overnight loans to banks at rates below the IOR rate. In effect, this turned what the Fed hoped would be a floor on the fed-funds rate into a ceiling. To raise rates now, the Fed increases the rate on reserves. So what’s to keep the Fed from raising rates this way again? The 2006 Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act is what. For that law only allows the central bank to pay interest on reserves “at a rate or rates not to exceed the general level of short-term interest rates.” The rub is that the Fed’s IOR rate of 50 basis points (0.5%) already exceeds the closest comparable market rates: those on shorter-term Treasury bills. At the start of this month, the four-week T-bill rate was just 26 basis points; since then it has slid even lower, all the way down to 10 basis points. Judging by these numbers, the Fed is already flouting the law. Another hike would mean flouting it all the more flagrantly. Lawmakers will be duty-bound to object.

When Jeb Hensarling (R., Texas), chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, grilled her earlier this year on this issue, Ms. Yellen responded feebly that the difference between the fed-funds rate and the IOR rate at the time—12 basis points—was “really quite small.” That’s rather like trying to avoid a speeding ticket by claiming to have been speeding only a little bit. Pressed further, Ms. Yellen insisted that, despite what she’d said earlier, the Fed’s rate settings were “legal and consistent with the [2006] act.” The law can only be stretched so far. Unless “general short-term rates” rise markedly, Congress can be expected to question the legality of any Fed rate increase. If it comes to that, Ms. Yellen will find it very hard to dissemble her way out of it.

Has the Fed any other choice but to stand pat or risk an ugly fight in Congress? It does. Instead of paying banks more to hoard reserves, it can tighten money the old fashioned way: by selling off some of its trillions of dollars in assets. Besides avoiding a brush with the law, selling reserves would mean taking a genuine step toward the “normalization” of policy that the Fed has long promised. That normalization would eventually allow the Fed to return to its older and more reliable—and perfectly legal—means of monetary control. Whether events will warrant tightening before the year is out is anybody’s guess. But if the Fed chooses to tighten, it should at least do it legally.

Read More : wsj.com/articles/a-legal-barrier-to-higher-interest-rates-1475017931

Bail Bondsman in Sanford – Supreme Court to Weigh In on Extraterritorial Scope of Patent Law and Laches

Source    : IP Watch-Dog News
By            :  Paul Ragusa & Daniel Hulseberg & Allyson Mackavage
Category : Seminole County Bail Bonds , Bail Bondsman in Sanford

Supreme Court to Weigh In on Extraterritorial Scope of Patent Law and Laches

On the heels of a busy term last year, the stage is set for the Supreme Court to review two more important issues regarding utility patents during the October term.  The first issue involves one aspect of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014) — i.e., whether a party who supplies a single, commodity component of a multi-component invention from the United States can be liable for infringement.  The second issue arises from SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 807 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), to determine whether laches remains a viable defense to patent infringement with respect to pre-litigation damages in certain circumstances.  The outcome of these cases may impact the scope of liability for extraterritorial acts and the strategy and pace of patent licensing negotiations, respectively.

Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp.
Promega is the exclusive licensee of a patent relating to kits for genetic testing including multiple components.  Life Technologies is a competitor of Promega, and admits to manufacturing and selling such kits.  One component of each kit is made in the United States, and then shipped to a manufacturing site abroad where the kits are assembled.  The kits are sold worldwide, and it is undisputed that sales within the United States constitute infringement under § 271(a).  However, a jury awarded Promega damages for sales outside the United States as well, on the theory that these foreign sales likewise constitute infringement of the U.S. patent under § 271(f)(1).  After the verdict, the District Court concluded that Promega failed to prove infringement as a matter of law, based largely on its interpretation of § 271(f)(1).  Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., No. 10-CV-281-BBC, 2012 WL 12862829 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 13, 2012).  Promega appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit.

In relevant part, § 271(f)(1) creates liability for infringement for a person who supplies “all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention . . . in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States.”  The Federal Circuit concluded that Life Technologies’ actions could constitute infringement under § 271(f)(1).  Promega Corp., 773 F.3d at 1356.  The Federal Circuit analyzed two aspects of the statutory provision: first, whether Promega could “actively induce” itself to assemble the kits and, second, whether a single component can be “a substantial portion.” Regarding the first aspect, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the statute requires only specific intent to cause the components to be combined.  Id. at 1351.  The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on this issue, and as such, the Federal Circuit’s decision will stand.  With respect to the second aspect, the Federal Circuit concluded that a supplier of a single component can be liable, reasoning that a single component is “a portion” of all components and stated that Taq polymerase is a substantial component, even by itself, in part because the kit is inoperable without it.   Id. at 1356.  In doing so, the court rejected Life Technologies’ argument that § 271(f)(2) is the only relevant subsection for the export of a single component, and as such, it is improper to apply § 271(f)(1).  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer “whether supplying a single, commodity component of a multi-component invention from the United States is an infringing act.”  Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016).

Notably, the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari as to this question and impose a quantitative test for infringement under § 271(f)(1).  Promega similarly urges a quantitative test, arguing that the Federal Circuit’s analysis reads a qualitative requirement into the statute, when in fact, the word “substantial” conveys a quantitative requirement, for example, a high percentage of the number of components.  Brief for Petitioners at 15-17, Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., No. 14-1538 (U.S. Sept. 1, 2016).  Promega argues that the structure of the two subsections of § 271(f) reinforces this understanding, and that the Federal Circuit has improperly extended the extraterritorial scope of the patent law, contrary to the presumption against extraterritoriality and congressional intent. Time will tell whether the Supreme Court will uphold the Federal Circuit’s understanding, but this case will have important ramifications for U.S. suppliers of commodity components, particularly those who supply components to manufacturers abroad.  Already, the Supreme Court’s partial denial of certiorari as to whether a third party is required for inducement means that integrated manufacturers are not shielded from infringement under § 271(f)(1).

SCA Hygiene v. First Quality Baby Products LLC
In SCA Hygiene Products, a heavily divided Federal Circuit reaffirmed en banc that laches can be a defense to patent infringement with respect to pre-litigation damages in certain circumstances.  To reach its conclusion, the court considered the language of 35 U.S.C. § 282, its legislative history, and commentary by one of the draftspersons of the 1952 Patent Act.  It also distinguished the Supreme Court’s “raging bull” decision Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), which found laches inapplicable to copyright cases. Although both the copyright statute at issue in Petrella and the patent statute at issue in SCA Hygiene included Congress’ statement on the timeliness for bringing a claim, the Federal Circuit found that patent law is different since Congress also codified a laches defense in § 282.  Accordingly, while “there is no room for a judicially created timeliness doctrine,” in copyright law, there is no separation of powers issue in finding that laches was preserved by the patent act.  SCA Hygiene Prods., 807 F.3d at 1329.  The statute itself lists categories of defenses – “[n]oninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or unenforceability” – rather than specific defenses.  The court also cited to House and Senate Reports, as well as influential commentary stating that the statute would include laches. While the court recognized that there may be tension between § 286 and § 282, it had “no authority to substitute [its] views for those expressed by Congress in a duly enacted statute.”  Id. at 1329-30.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question: “Whether and to what extent the defense of laches may bar a claim for patent infringement brought within the Patent Act’s six-year statutory limitations period, 35 U.S.C. § 286.”  SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1824 (2016).  Petitioner argues that the plain meaning of Section 286 directs a six year limitations period, and thus courts are not at liberty to apply laches to shorten that period.  Brief for Petitioners, SCA Hygiene Prods., LLC,  No. 15-927 (U.S. July 15, 2016).  Not surprisingly, Petitioner also argues that the case is indistinguishable from Petrella, and that the Supreme Court’s analysis in that decision should apply to both copyright and patent settings.  Petitioner further argues that the Federal Circuit decision undermines statutory policies of clarity, predictability, notice and dispute resolution. Respondents reply by arguing that laches was codified as a defense to damages, citing to pre-1952 law and Congressional acquiescence since 1952.  Respondents also distinguish Petrella and dismiss the Petition’s policy arguments.  Brief for Respondents, SCA Hygiene Prods.,  No. 15-927 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2016).  Nine amicus curiae briefs have also been filed, including by several well-known bar associations.  With oral argument scheduled for November 1, 2016, both patent owners and institutions which regularly receive patent assertion letters will look for resolution of an issue that may impact both the strategy patent licensing negotiations and the availability of substantial damages in many cases.

Read More : ipwatchdog.com/2016/09/26/supreme-court-extraterritorial-scope-patent-law-laches/id=72969/

Bail Bond Sanford – California Supreme Court to consider suit over Yelp review

Source     : kake News
By            : SUDHIN THANAWALA – Associated Press
Category : Bail Bond Sanford , Sanford Bail Bond

California Supreme Court to consider suit over Yelp review

The California Supreme Court agreed Wednesday to consider a lawsuit that Yelp.com warns could lead to the removal of negative reviews on the popular website. The seven-member court voted unanimously Wednesday to take up an appeal by Yelp of a lower court ruling upholding an order requiring Yelp to remove posts against a San Francisco law firm. Yelp wants the Supreme Court to overturn the ruling, saying that if it’s allowed to stand, it will open the door for businesses to force the company to remove critical reviews.

Dawn Hassell, the law firm’s managing attorney, says the business review website is exaggerating the stakes of her legal effort. She says it aims only to remove from Yelp lies by a former client that a judge determined were defamatory, not just negative. Hassell referred comment Wednesday to her attorney, Monique Olivier, who said in a statement she was not surprised the Supreme Court has taken up the case given the “amount of attention” it has received. “This case is not one of a ‘bad review’ ” she said. “It is a case where a court adjudicated statements to be defamatory after receiving and reviewing evidence about the falsity of those statements.” Aaron Schur, Yelp’s senior director of litigation, said the company looked forward to explaining to the court “how the lower court’s decision is ripe for abuse, contradicts longstanding legal principles, and restricts the ability of websites to provide a balanced spectrum of views online.”

Though its impact is in dispute, the case is getting attention from some of the biggest internet companies in the world, which say a ruling against Yelp could stifle free speech online and effectively gut other websites whose main function is offering consumers reviews of services and businesses. Internet giants Facebook, Twitter and Microsoft said in a letter to the California Supreme Court last month that the ruling “radically departs from a large, unanimous and settled body of federal and state court precedent” and could be used to “silence a vast quantity of protected and important speech.” Hassell’s 2013 lawsuit accused a client she briefly represented in a personal injury case of defaming her on Yelp by falsely claiming that her firm failed to communicate with the client, among other things.

San Francisco Superior Court Judge Donald Sullivan found the statements defamatory and ordered the client and Yelp to remove them. Hassell said the client failed to answer her lawsuit or remove the posts, so she had to seek a court order demanding that Yelp do it. A second judge and a state appeals court upheld Sullivan’s order. Yelp says the judge’s order violates a 1996 federal law that courts have widely interpreted as protecting internet companies from liability for posts by third-party users and prohibiting the company from being treated as the speaker or publisher of users’ posts. Internet law experts expect Yelp to prevail.

Read More : kake.com/story/33152734/california-supreme-court-to-consider-suit-over-yelp-review

Sanford Bail Bond – Massachusetts Supreme Court Says It’s Perfectly Legitimate for Black Men to Flee Police

Source    : Daily Signal
By            : John G. Malcolm
Category : Bail Bond Sanford , Sanford Bail Bond

Massachusetts Supreme Court Says It’s Perfectly Legitimate for Black Men to Flee Police

Has it really come to this? On the heels of dramatic disagreement between the two major party presidential candidates about how to react to ongoing tension between the police and the African-American community, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has unanimously concluded that a black man fleeing from a police officer investigating criminal activity is indicative of—nothing at all. In the wake of recent shootings of African-American civilians by police officers in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Charlotte, North Carolina, followed by violent protests in Charlotte, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump had dramatically different reactions. Clinton laid the blame on “systemic racism” and “implicit bias” and called for more community policing. Trump was equally troubled by these events, but called for more extensive use of stop-and-frisk tactics in high-crime areas. He speculated that perhaps the officer involved in the Tulsa shooting had “choked” when faced with a tense situation. In the meantime, in a unanimous opinion issued on Tuesday, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts gave implicit approval for black men to run when the police ask to speak to them. The Daily Signal is the multimedia news organization of The Heritage Foundation.  We’ll respect your inbox and keep you informed.

The facts in Commonwealth v. Jimmy Warren are pretty straightforward. Sometime after 9 p.m. on Dec. 18, 2011, in the Roxbury section of Boston (a high-crime area), a teenager entered his bedroom and saw a black male wearing a “red hoodie” jumping out the window. When he went to the window, he saw two more black men, one in a “black hoodie” and the other in dark clothes, running away. The thieves had taken a backpack, a computer, and five baseball hats. The victim relayed the information to Officer Luis Anjos, who drove around the neighborhood for approximately 15 minutes looking for anyone who matched the victim’s admittedly vague description. Because it was a cold night, Anjos did not encounter any pedestrians until he came upon Jimmy Warren and another black male. Both were wearing dark clothing, and one of them was wearing a hoodie. Anjos decided to conduct a “field interrogation observation” (FIO), police jargon for a consensual encounter in which the officer asks someone what they are up to, and the person remains free to leave at any time. Anjos asked the two males to “wait a minute,” and they made eye contact with him before jogging away into a park. Anjos radioed what happened to his station and was overheard by two other officers in the neighborhood, who saw the two men coming out of the other side of the park. One of the officers said, “Hey fellas,” and one of the two men—Warren—ran back into the park. The officer observed Warren clutching the right side of his pants (consistent with carrying a gun in his pocket) as he ignored repeated requests to stop.

Following a brief chase, one of the officers drew his weapon and, after a struggle, arrested Warren. The officers found a gun near where Warren was apprehended, and he was subsequently charged and convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. Prior to trial, Warren moved to exclude the firearm as evidence, claiming that its discovery was the result of an illegal stop because the police lacked “reasonable suspicion”—the applicable legal standard under the Fourth Amendment to justify an investigatory stop—to stop him in connection with the breaking and entering that had occurred roughly a half-hour earlier. The trial court denied the motion, but the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the motion should have been granted. In doing so the court noted, correctly, that an investigatory stop cannot be based on a mere hunch. However, the court acknowledged, “a combination of factors that are each innocent of themselves may, when taken together, amount to the requisite reasonable belief that a person has, is, or will commit a particular crime.” The court noted, again correctly, that the victim’s description of the perpetrators was extremely vague. Besides, since the victim was not sure where the thieves went, and since nearly 30 minutes had elapsed, it was hard to connect the location where Anjos first spotted Warren to the crime Anjos was investigating.

Based on those facts alone, the officers would not have reasonable suspicion to tie Warren to the crime. Warren would have been well within his rights to tell the officer that he didn’t want to speak to him and to walk away. Yet that is not what Warren did. Instead, Warren made eye contact with the officer and then hightailed it out of there, grabbing for his right pants pocket in the process. Would that be enough to justify an investigatory stop? Not according to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, which stated, “Where a suspect is under no obligation to respond to a police officer’s inquiry, we are of the view that flight to avoid that contact should be given little, if any, weight as a factor probative of reasonable suspicion.” Noting that African-Americans are involved in a higher percentage of police-civilian encounters relative to their percentage of the city’s population, the court cited a study by the American Civil Liberties Union and an older internal study by the Boston Police Department. According to Boston Police Commissioner Bill Evans, the latter study did not indicate any bias by the Boston police who were, and are, targeting high-crime areas. It is sadly a fact that violent crime rates are much higher in communities of color in and around the Boston area.

Read More : dailysignal.com/2016/09/23/massachusetts-supreme-court-says-its-perfectly-legitimate-for-black-men-to-flee-police/

Bondsman in Seminole County – High court judge uses emojis in decision, could get award for it

Source    : Australasian Lawyer
By            : Sol Dolor
Category : Bail Bondsman in Sanford , Bondsman in Seminole County

High court judge uses emojis in decision, could get award for it

A High Court judge may be the last person one would visualise when asked to picture a person who uses emojis in official documents, but one UK justice has earned praise after utilising the modern digital icons in one of his judgements. The Hon. Mr. Justice Peter Jackson used emojis and uncomplicated English in a long family law judgment so that children and a mother can fully understand the decision.

According to a Legal Cheek report, the case was about a British Muslim convert who reportedly tried to take four children to Syria, but was stopped in Istanbul Turkey. Justice Jackson was explaining in the document to a 10-year-old and 12-year-old why they would only have limited contact with their father from now. The father is now serving an 18-year prison term for firearms offences.

The decision may be long but it and Justice Jackson are now being hailed as a champions of plain English. According to a report from Metro UK, the 6,555-word ruling is being considered for a Plain English Award by the Plain English Campaign. Unfortunately for us, the decision’s online version does not contain the emojis.

Read More : australasianlawyer.com.au/news/lighter-side-high-court-judge-uses-emojis-in-decision-could-get-award-for-it-223880.aspx

Seminole County Bail Bonds – 21 States Sue Obama Administration Over New Overtime Rules

Source    : Governing News
By            : Tribune News Service
Category : Seminole County Bail Bonds , Bail Bondsman in Sanford

21 States Sue Obama Administration Over New Overtime Rules

Texas is playing the leading role in a double-barreled legal challenge issued by state officials and business groups against the White House’s effort to make millions more Americans eligible for overtime pay. Attorney General Ken Paxton on Tuesday led 21 states in suing the U.S. Labor Department over the new overtime rules in a federal district court in Texas. The Texas Association of Business, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other business leaders filed a similar lawsuit later in the day. The new regulations _ which go into effect in December _ raise the overtime eligibility threshold to $47,476 a year from $23,660 a year. Administration officials have estimated that the change could benefit more than 4 million Americans _ and hundreds of thousands of Texans. But both lawsuits accuse the Obama administration of overreach, with Paxton calling the new rules part of a “radical leftist agenda.”

“Once again, President Obama is trying to unilaterally rewrite the law,” he said. “And this time, it may lead to disastrous consequences for our economy.” Labor Secretary Thomas E. Perez said in a news release that he is “confident in the legality of all aspects of our final overtime rule.” “Despite the sound legal and policy footing on which the rule is constructed, the same interests that have stood in the way of middle-class Americans getting paid when they work extra are continuing their obstructionist tactics,” he said. Advocates for the overtime overhaul were also quick to criticize the lawsuits. Lawrence Mishel, president of the liberal Economic Policy Institute, said sarcastically that the salary standard had also been raised in the past by “other communists like George W. Bush and Gerald Ford.”

“It’s remarkable that somehow they think it’s an overreach,” he said. “But it’s not an overreach when an employer asks a $25,000-a-year employee to work 20 hours of overtime for free?” Paxton _ like his predecessor, Republican Gov. Greg Abbott _ has been no friend to the Obama administration. He’s challenged the federal government on several fronts, with his focus more recently trained on transgender rights being pushed by the White House. The latest suit pairs Paxton with a coterie of Republican officials from Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah and Wisconsin. The business-led lawsuit, meanwhile, features chambers of commerce from across Texas, including those in Plano and greater Irving. The efforts take aim at one of President Barack Obama’s key economic initiatives.

Millions of American workers have been exempt from overtime rules because they are classified as executives, administrators or professionals. Even if they work more than the standard 40-hour workweek, they don’t enjoy the perk of time-and-a-half pay for those extra hours. Those exemptions don’t apply, however, if the worker is paid less than $23,660 a year. Obama and others sought to update the rules _ last changed in 2004 _ to boost store managers, office supervisors and other middle-income, white-collar Americans. The new rules will double the threshold amount, opening up a whole new class of workers to overtime pay. “We’ve got to keep making sure hard work is rewarded,” Obama wrote in an op-ed last year. “That’s how America should do business. In this country, a hard day’s work deserves a fair day’s pay.”

Texas groups responded to Paxton’s lawsuit with dismay. State Democratic Party director Crystal Perkins accused the GOP of scoring political points at the expense of Texans. Texas AFL-CIO president John Patrick said the suit showed “zero concern for working people who are forced to put in free hours at the whim of their employers.” But the new rules have already faced criticism from business groups. Some have said the change will burden businesses and, ultimately, consumers. Others predicted that businesses will end up cutting off staffers at 40 hours. And others have said the issue is not that the threshold increased, but that it increased by so much and with other moving parts. “The Department of Labor has really exceeded its statuary authority,” said Texas Association of Business president Chris Wallace, who said he’s heard concern from businesses across the state. “It’s not good for business.” The lawsuits challenge the new rules on multiple fronts. The states’ suit blasted a new provision that would increase the salary standard every three years, arguing that it would deprive the opportunity for feedback about those future changes. And it said the overall focus on the salary threshold confuses the requirements laid out in the law.

The Labor Department’s “use of, and conclusive emphasis on, the salary test defies the statutory text … congressional intent, and common sense,” the state lawsuit said. The state lawsuit also dwelt at length on the potential impact on government. It went so far as to suggest that, under the new rules, “the federal executive could deliberately exhaust state budgets simply through the enforcement of the overtime rule.” Bennett Sandlin, executive director of the Texas Municipal League, said local governments do have concerns about the new overtime rules. He said his organization had provided some research to Paxton’s office on how many positions across the state could potentially be affected. He said the biggest worry is that some cities might have to hire more employees at taxpayer expense. “It could have a significant effect,” he said.

Read More : governing.com/topics/mgmt/tns-texas-overtime-lawsuit-obama.html

Bail Bond Seminole County – Supreme Court of Ohio Issues Sweeping Decision Interpreting the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act

Source    : Lexology News
By            : Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP
Category : Bail Bond Seminole County , Bail Bondsman in Sanford

Supreme Court of Ohio Issues Sweeping Decision Interpreting the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act

On September 15, 2016, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued numerous decisions concerning the application of the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act (R.C. 5301.56) (DMA). In the lead case, Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., et al., 2016-Ohio-5796, the Court held that:

– The 1989 version of the DMA (1989 DMA) was not self-executing (i.e., did not automatically transfer ownership of dormant mineral rights to the surface owner of the property by operation of law). Rather, the surface owner must have filed a quiet title action seeking a decree that the dormant mineral interest had been abandoned in order to merge those rights into the surface estate;
– The 2006 version of the DMA (2006 DMA) applies to claims to abandon dormant mineral rights asserted after its effective date (June 30, 2006) and specifies the procedure that a surface owner is required to follow in order to have dormant mineral rights abandoned and merged with the surface estate; and
– The payment of a delay rental during the primary term of an oil and gas lease does not qualify as a “savings event” under the DMA.

BACKGROUND

The oil, gas, and mineral rights under certain property located in Harrison County, Ohio were severed in 1959. Petitioner is the current surface owner of the property (Surface Owner). Respondents are the current owner and lessees of the oil and gas rights underlying the property (Severed Mineral Owners). In 2013, Surface Owner filed a complaint against Severed Mineral Owners seeking, among other relief, declaratory judgment and quiet title in his favor as to the oil and gas rights under the property by virtue of the 1989 DMA. Severed Mineral Owners counterclaimed for declaratory judgment and quiet title in their favor. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment, and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, concluding that its ruling on the motions required a clarification of Ohio law, certified the following two questions to the Supreme Court of Ohio: (1) whether the 1989 DMA or the 2006 DMA should be applied to a quiet title action filed after the 2006 DMA became effective when the complaint asserts that the dormant mineral rights vested in the surface owner as a result of abandonment occurring prior to 2006; and (2) whether the payment of a delay rental during the primary term of an oil and gas lease qualifies as a savings event under the DMA.

HOLDING

Before answering the two certified questions, the Court first analyzed whether the 1989 DMA was self-executing. Surface Owner, submitting that the 1989 DMA was self-executing, argued that the 1989 DMA contains nothing requiring any affirmative action or judicial confirmation establishing that the dormant mineral rights had been abandoned and vested in the surface owner. In support of his argument, Surface Owner cited to the fact that the Ohio General Assembly largely adopted the Uniform Dormant Mineral Interests Act when enacting the 1989 DMA, but rejected the uniform act’s requirement that the surface owner file a quiet title/declaratory judgment action to abandon dormant mineral rights. In rebuttal, Severed Mineral Owners, submitting that the 1989 DMA was not self-executing, argued that the 1989 DMA deemed dormant mineral rights abandoned and vested in the surface owner without expressly extinguishing them or declaring them null and void, and the legislature therefore intended the surface owner to take legal action to obtain ownership of the mineral interest. In support of their argument, Severed Mineral Owners highlighted the fact that the DMA is a supplement to the Ohio Marketable Title Act, R.C. § 5301.47 et seq. (MTA), which was enacted to simplify and facilitate land title transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record chain of title to determine ownership. If the 1989 DMA were held to be self-executing, dormant mineral rights would automatically vest in the surface owner outside the record chain of title. Such a result would be in contravention of the MTA’s legislative purpose as well as in derogation of the common law presumption against forfeiture.

The Court held that the 1989 DMA is not self-executing. In reaching its decision, the Court focused on the contrasting language found in certain statutes comprising the larger MTA, which is focused on extinguishing ancient interests in land, and the language found in 1989 DMA, which is focused on the abandonment of certain minerals. Those statutes comprising the larger MTA, in fact, use the word “extinguish” and “null and void” to describe what happens to ancient interests existing prior to the claimant’s “root of title.” The 1989 DMA, on the other hand, uses the phrase “shall be deemed abandoned and vested” to describe what happens to dormant mineral rights. The Court found the difference in language to be material. By using the word “deemed” in the 1989 DMA, the Court found that the Ohio General Assembly created a conclusive presumption that a holder of mineral rights had abandoned his mineral rights if the 20 year statutory period under the DMA passed without a savings event. Without this conclusive presum tion, the owner of the surface estate would be required to prove at trial that the holder of mineral rights had the intent to abandon those rights. Such intent would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove if the owner of the surface estate was unable to locate or identify the holder of the minerals from a review of the public records. However, the Court described the conclusive presumption of abandonment as only an evidentiary tool that applied to litigation seeking to quiet title to a dormant mineral interest. Thus, it held the 1989 DMA was not self-executing. Surface owners were required to commence a quiet title action seeking a decree that the dormant mineral rights were abandoned under the 1989 DMA. After holding that the 1989 DMA was not self-executing, the Court then turned to directly answer the two questions certified to it by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The first question was whether the 1989 DMA or the 2006 DMA should be applied to a quiet title action filed after the 2006 DMA became effective when the complaint alleges that the dormant mineral rights vested in the surface owner as a result of abandonment occurring prior to 2006. The Court held that the 2006 DMA applies to claims to abandon dormant mineral rights asserted after the effective date of the 2006 DMA (June 30, 2006) even if such claims accrued before the effective date of the 2006 DMA. Because the 1989 DMA does not abandon and vest dormant mineral rights in the surface owner by operation of law, the surface owner is obligated to follow the abandonment procedure set forth in the 2006 DMA for claims asserted after the 2006 DMA became operative.

Surface Owner argued that application of the 2006 DMA to claims of abandonment accruing prior to June 30, 2006 violates the Retroactivity Clause under Article II, Section 28, of the Ohio Constitution. However, the Court found this argument unpersuasive. A statute violates the Retroactivity Clause if it is substantive in nature (i.e., “affects an accrued substantive right, or imposes new or additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a past transaction”) and is applied retroactively. The Court found both of these elements to be absent. First, the 2006 DMA is not expressly retroactive. As such, it applies only prospectively to claims for abandonment of dormant mineral rights. Second, the 2006 DMA does not deprive the surface owner of a right to a dormant mineral interest that accrued prior to the effective date of the 2006 DMA. The 2006 DMA “modified only the method and procedure by which the right is recognized and protected.” The second question was whether the payment of a delay rental during the primary term of an oil and gas lease qualifies as a savings event under the DMA. Delay rental “represent[s] sums paid by the lessee to the lessor on an annual, quarterly or other basis for the privilege of postponing drilling or other operations under an oil and gas lease.” The Court held that payment of a delay rental is not a savings event for purposes of the DMA. There are six (6) savings events under the DMA. One of those savings events occurs when “[t]he mineral interest has been the subject of a title transaction that has been filed or recorded in the office of the county recorder in which the lands are located” (Title Transaction Savings Event). R.C. § 5301.56(B)(3)(a). Payment of delay rentals does not qualify as a Title Transaction Saving Event because no record of payment is filed in the office of the county recorder. Moreover, a delay rental payment alone does not “affect title” to the dormant mineral interest. For these two reasons, the Court found that delay rental payments do not qualify as a Title Transaction Savings Event.

Read More : lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=145dcbe6-da09-4701-9bbf-3a4f1a93f461

Bail Bondsman in Sanford – East Coast lawyers file legal challenge of changes to Supreme Court appointments

Source     : Metro News
By            : Michael MacDonald
Category : Bail Bondsman in Sanford , Bondsman in Seminole County

East Coast lawyers file legal challenge of changes to Supreme Court appointments

Trial lawyers from across Atlantic Canada are taking Ottawa to court to ensure the region keeps its traditional Supreme Court of Canada seat, saying Prime Minister Justin Trudeau can’t change the custom without the approval of every province. Trudeau has said regional representation among the top court’s judges is important, but he has yet to commit to replacing a retired justice from Nova Scotia with someone from the same region, arguing that other forms of diversity are just as important. The Atlantic Provinces Trial Lawyers Association said Monday it is seeking an order from the Nova Scotia Supreme Court that would require Ottawa to amend the Constitution if it wants to drop regional representation as an unwritten constitutional convention. Such a change would require unanimous consent of the provinces, the association said.

“It raises questions of regionalism, which are very important to Atlantic Canadians and their participation in Confederation,” said Ray Wagner, a Halifax lawyer and spokesman for the association. “The problem is that we will get swallowed up by larger population areas that get appointments — and we get forgotten and somewhat marginalized.” Without adequate regional representation, Atlantic Canada could be hurt by future Supreme Court decisions dealing with fisheries matters, employment insurance and transfer payments, he said. As grounds for the court application, the association argues that the absence of a judge from one of the four Atlantic provinces would “fundamentally change the long-standing composition of Canada’s highest court.”

The Canadian Bar Association has already urged Trudeau to respect the regional appointment custom, which does not appear in the Constitution or in Canadian case law. The convention, in place for 141 years, shouldn’t be changed without invoking the Constitution’s amending formula because the Supreme Court of Canada has already made a similar ruling regarding proposed changes to the Senate, Wagner said. In April 2014, the court slammed the door on reforming or abolishing the Senate without reopening the Constitution. The high court said then-prime minister Stephen Harper’s plan to impose term limits on senators and create an election process couldn’t be done by the federal government alone.

Nova Scotia Premier Stephen McNeil issued a statement Monday reasserting the province’s position that the rule should not be changed. “We believe there are excellent Atlantic Canadian candidates for the seat, and look forward to the region’s continued representation on the high court,” the premier said. The court challenge in Nova Scotia comes as a deadline in the appointment process is fast approaching. Later this month, a new, non-partisan advisory board is expected to recommend to the prime minister a list of three to five candidates who are qualified, functionally bilingual and representative of the diversity of Canada.

The seven-member panel, led by former prime minister Kim Campbell, is expected to review candidates from across the country. However, federal Justice Minister Jody Wilson-Raybould told the House of Commons the list will include two candidates from Atlantic Canada. “Regional representation is important and will be considered in the appointments process,” Wilson-Raybould said in a statement afterwards, adding that the advisory board has been asked that the regional custom be “one of the factors” taken into consideration when making its selections. Trudeau has said his Liberal government is “folding in all sorts of different aspects to get the best possible people to sit on the Supreme Court.” Last month, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin suggested an appointment made without regional consideration could end up being challenged in court. “Indeed from what I see, it could be something that might someday come before us, but this is a question I think I have to leave aside,” she said at the time. “I’m the last to know what will come before the court.”

Read More : metronews.ca/news/canada/2016/09/19/east-coast-lawyers-challenge-ottawa-on-changes-to-supreme-court-appointments.html

Bail Bond Sanford – High Court judge uses emojis to help children understand family law judgment

Source     : Legal Cheek News
By            : Thomas Connelly
Category : Bail Bond Sanford , Sanford Bail Bond

High Court judge uses emojis to help children understand family law judgment

A High Court judge has embraced the modern world and used emojis to help children involved in a family dispute understand his judgment more easily. In what is thought to be an English legal first, Mr Justice Peter Jackson has used the popular smiley face symbols to explain a complex point of evidence (screenshot below). Opting to use them on several occasions, the emojis (unfortunately) don’t appear in the online version of the judgment.

As well as using simple language throughout — law students, rejoice! — Jackson, who became a High Court judge back in 2010, reveals that he has kept things as “short as possible so that the mother and the older children can follow it”. The case in question involved a British Muslim convert, who allegedly tried to take four children — a brother and sister plus two younger children of whom he is the biological father — to Syria. The family, who are originally from Lancashire, were eventually stopped by authorities in Istanbul, Turkey.

Jackson, avoiding complex legalese, explained to two of the children, aged 10 and 12, why they would have only limited contact with their father going forward. Referred to only as “Mr A” in the judgment for legal reasons, the father is currently serving an 18-year prison sentence after being found guilty of firearms offences earlier this summer. Jackson, a former family law silk, has since been praised for his refreshing and unique approach. One Crown Office Row barrister Charlotte John described the top judge’s use of emojis and language as “refreshing”.

Read More : legalcheek.com/2016/09/high-court-judge-uses-emojis-to-help-children-understand-family-law-judgment/