Sanford Bail Bonds – Supreme Court: Cities can sue banks under U.S. housing law

Source     : DenverPost News
By             : Mark Sherman | The Associated Press
Category :  Bail Bond Sanford , Sanford Bail Bonds

Supreme Court: Cities can sue banks under U.S. housing law

The Supreme Court ruled Monday that cities may sue banks under the federal anti-discrimination in housing law but said those lawsuits must tie claims about predatory lending practices among minority customers directly to declines in property taxes. The justices’ 5-3 ruling partly validated a novel approach by Miami and other cities to try to hold banks accountable under the federal Fair Housing Act for the wave of foreclosures during the housing crisis a decade ago.

But the court still threw out an appellate ruling in Miami’s favor and ordered a lower court to re-examine the city’s lawsuit against Wells Fargo and Bank of America to be sure that there is a direct connection between the lending practices and the city’s losses. Miami claimed that Wells Fargo and Bank of America, as well as Citigroup, pursued a decadelong pattern of targeting African-American and Hispanic borrowers for costlier and riskier loans than those offered to white customers. The loans to minority homeowners went into default more quickly as well, the city said.

Wells Fargo and Bank of America appealed the ruling by the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, arguing that cities can’t use the Fair Housing Act to sue over reductions in tax revenues. The banks said the connection between a loan and the tax consequences is too tenuous. Citigroup did not appeal, though its lawsuit also would be affected by what the appeals court does in response to Monday’s ruling. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote in his majority opinion a city can make claim for financial harm under the anti-discrimination housing law. But he said the second issue, tying the loans to the drop in tax revenues, is more difficult. Breyer wrote that there must be “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”

The appeals court should decide that issue, Breyer said. Writing in dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas said he would have given the banks what they asked for and dismissed Miami’s lawsuit. Justices Samuel Alito and Anthony Kennedy sided with Thomas. The banks claimed that a ruling for Miami could lead to lawsuits asking for billions of dollars. The city said those fears were unjustified and pointed to similar lawsuits filed by Baltimore and Memphis, Tennessee, that were settled for less than $10 million each.

Read more here : denverpost.com/2017/05/01/supreme-court-us-housing-law-cities-sue-banks/

Sanford Bail Bonds – How ‘ideologically uniform’ is the legal academy?

Source     : Washington Post News
By             : Jonathan H. Adler
Category :  Bail Bond Sanford , Sanford Bail Bonds

How ‘ideologically uniform’ is the legal academy?

How much more liberal are law professors than members of the legal profession? A new paper by Adam Bonica (Stanford University), Adam S. Chilton (University of Chicago), Kyle Rozema (Northwestern University) and Maya Sen (Harvard University), “The Legal Academy’s Ideological Uniformity,” provides some answers. Their bottom line: The legal academy is significantly more liberal than the legal profession, which is notable because the legal profession itself is more liberal than the public at large. Here is how the authors summarize some of their findings: We find that approximately 15% of law professors are conservative and that only approximately one out of every twenty law schools have more conservative law professors than liberal ones. In addition, we find that these patterns vary, with higher-ranked schools having an even smaller presence of conservative law professors. We then compare the ideological balance of the legal academy to that of the legal profession. Compared to the 15% of law professors that are conservative, 35% of lawyers overall are conservative. Law professors are more liberal than graduates of top 14 law schools, lawyers working at the largest law firms, former federal law clerks, and federal judges. Although we find that professors are more liberal than the alumni at all but a handful of law schools, there is a strong relationship between the ideologies of professors from a law school and the ideologies of alumni from that school. However, this relationship is weaker for schools with more conservative alumni.

These findings are based upon an examination of reported political donations. While this is an admittedly imperfect measure of ideology, it does allow for comparisons across population groups. Moreover, reliance on political donations is less selective than one might think, as the authors report that more than 60 percent of law professors made reported political donations between 1979 and 2014. Although the authors believe that other factors explain some of the split between the ideology of legal academics and legal practitioners, even after accounting for such factors, they find that law professors are significantly more liberal than lawyers generally. Does this matter? I’ve certainly argued that the ideological uniformity of legal academia affects teaching and scholarship (most recently here). The authors of this study suggest that it could also affect the political relevance and influence of law professors. They write: The ideological tilt of the legal academy has potentially broad implications. For instance, because law professors are overwhelmingly liberal, groups of law professors advocating for liberal positions can easily be marginalized.  This letter was criticized by some as simply representing the views of the left leaning legal academy . . . . To assess … these criticisms, we match the signatories of the letter to our sample of law professor ideology, and find that only 4% of the signatories that appear in our data are conservative. This raises the question of whether the reception to the letter would have been different had more conservative law professors signed the letter. Although we have no way to answer this question, the endeavor might have been given more credence had more conservative professors participated in the letter: observers might have been less likely to expect Republican-leaning law professors to oppose Sessions ideologically, thus making such criticisms more powerful and effective. We argue that this example illustrates that the legal academy’s ideological uniformity limits its political credibility.

One could extend this analysis to current controversies at state universities, such as proposed measures to curtail tenure or limit the activities of legal clinics and academic centers at state universities. Appeals to “academic freedom” are less convincing when the only ones in a position to benefit from such principles sit on one side of the aisle. Writing in opposition to a proposed measure in North Carolina that would prohibit the University of North Carolina School of Law’s Center for Civil Rights from engaging in litigation, Gene Nichol suggested the center’s critics are “nakedly ideological” because they would have no problem with law school programs enlisting students in efforts to protect gun rights or religious liberty. He might be right, but how would we know? It’s not as if UNC’s law school has any such programs, or even a critical mass of right-leaning faculty members. I agree with much that Nichol has to say in his piece, but I also suspect his arguments would be more persuasive to a Republican-dominated state legislature if there were more ideological diversity on UNC’s law faculty and within the law school’s academic programming. Assuming there is substantial ideological uniformity in the legal academy, and that this is a problem, there remains the problem of what to do about it. Here the authors of the above-mentioned study note that remedial measures, such as some sort of “affirmative action” for right-leaning faculty, could compromise efforts to advance other values. I agree. However well-intentioned, heavy-handed efforts to impose “balance” on law school faculties could do more harm than good. I believe law schools should seek to encourage more viewpoint diversity within their ranks, but I oppose any such efforts that involve quotas or rigid requirements. This Iowa proposal to require partisan balance in university hiring, for example, strikes me as a supremely bad idea. In my opinion, the way forward begins with efforts to cultivate an appreciation of the value of differing perspectives and viewpoints and a broader recognition that ideological uniformity undermines effective legal education. The first step toward a solution is recognizing there’s a problem.

Read more here: washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/04/17/how-ideologically-uniform-is-the-legal-academy/

Sanford Bail Bonds – Utah Supreme Court Rules Against Tesla in Push to Sell Cars

Source     : Fox Business News
By             : Michelle L. Price | AP
Category : Bail Bond Sanford , Sanford Bail Bonds

Utah Supreme Court Rules Against Tesla in Push to Sell Cars

Tesla’s push to sell its all-electric vehicles in Utah hit another roadblock Monday when the state Supreme Court upheld a decision by Utah licensing officials to deny the automaker a license to sell new cars. Tesla had argued that a state law barring car manufacturers from owning dealerships didn’t apply to the company. Tesla sells its cars directly to customers rather than using independent dealerships, something Tesla attorneys argued is vital to their business.

Tesla must sell its own cars because a sale depends on convincing customers that electric cars are better than those with a gas engine. The company also argued that Utah law doesn’t block car makers from selling directly_it only blocks car makers from owning a dealership that’s set up as a franchise. In the decision Monday, Supreme Court justices didn’t address whether Utah law blocks a car maker from selling its vehicles directly or whether it’s vital for the car maker to sell its own product.

The justices instead focused on a subsidiary company that Tesla set up to sell cars in the state, called Tesla UT. Tesla UT applied for an auto dealer license, and because Tesla UT is wholly owned by Tesla, state licensing officials were correct in a 2015 decision denying the license, the justices wrote. In a statement, Tesla said the ruling was “disappointing for Tesla and all Utah consumers interested in consumer choice, free markets, and sustainable energy.” The company said it will pursue all options in Utah, including working with the Legislature, and will continue offering service in Utah for Tesla cars.

The Utah Automobile Dealers Association has argued that Tesla is required by to comply with the franchise law, which is designed to keep large car makers like GM from pushing out independent dealers selling the same cars. Tesla has said that law protects a monopoly by locally powerful car dealerships and violates free-market economic policies in Utah’s constitution. An effort to try to change the law earlier and accommodate Tesla failed in Utah’s Legislature earlier last year after the company pulled its support, saying the fix wouldn’t allow it to keep any inventory in the state. Unable to sell cars through its $3 million showroom in Salt Lake City, Tesla instead decided to take its fight to Utah’s Supreme Court.

Read more here: foxbusiness.com/politics/2017/04/03/utah-supreme-court-rules-against-tesla-in-push-to-sell-cars.html

Sanford Bail Bonds – America’s Supreme Court hints it may keep a closer eye on the executive branch

Source      : Economist News
By              : Press Release
Category  : Bail Bond Sanford , Sanford Bail Bonds

America’s Supreme Court hints it may keep a closer eye on the executive branch

In the midst of a fresh crack-down on undocumented migrants and a pending revision of the president’s travel ban, the Supreme Court heard an immigration case with potentially wide-ranging implications. Esquivel-Quintana v Jefferson Sessions is the first Supreme Court case naming Donald Trump’s new attorney general as a party—though it concerns a matter that took place well before he joined the cabinet. Depending on how the justices rule, immigration authorities may soon either enjoy a freer hand to deport non-citizens or find themselves judicially constrained in these efforts. Juan Esquivel-Quintana arrived in America from Mexico with his parents at the age of 12 and became a lawful permanent resident. In 2009, Mr Esquivel-Quintana served 90 days in jail and five years on probation for statutory rape. He was found to have violated California’s penal code by having sex, at the age of 20, with his 16-year-old girlfriend. (The law criminalises sexual relations between an adult and “a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator”.) Later, after moving from California to Michigan, Mr Esquivel-Quintana became subject to removal proceedings by the Department of Homeland Security. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that “sexual abuse of a minor” is an “aggravated felony” and constitutes grounds for deportation. Mr Esquivel-Quintana’s crime, authorities said, fit that bill. Three rounds of litigation later, Mr Esquivel-Quintana found no relief. An immigration judge, a panel of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals all confirmed the decision to send him back to Mexico. In his final appeal to the Supreme Court, however, Mr Esquivel-Quintana seemed to have some hope of staying in America. The case turns on the meaning of the phrase “sexual abuse of a minor”. Jeffrey Fisher, Mr Esquivel-Quintana’s lawyer, told the justices that his client’s actions would not have cost him a day in jail in 43 states. And of the seven remaining states, most construe sex with near-17-year-olds as a misdemeanor, “and only one of those seven states calls that conduct abuse”. On top of that, Mr Esquivel-Quintana’s behaviour would not have been a crime under either the Model Penal Code (a project in the 1960s to standardise state criminal laws) or federal law. In sum, Mr Fisher argued, the justices “could decide this case by saying that the seven states that have laws like California’s…but draw the age of consent at 18, automatically fall outside of sexual abuse of a minor”. Taking in the full “sweep” of state and federal law, Mr Fisher proposed, 16 ought to be accepted as the age of consent for the purposes of the INA.

Speaking for the federal government, Allon Kedem refuted the notion that the definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” is a function of counting up laws in the 50 states and finding an average. This technique (taking a “multijurisdictional survey”, in legalese) has not been the Supreme Court’s strategy in most similar cases, Mr Kedem argued. All but twice, the justices have ignored or “specifically rejected the relevance of those multijurisdictional surveys, saying that they would shed no light on the central inquiry”. There is good reason for eschewing a glance over the nation’s many conflicting sex-crime laws, Mr Kedem claimed. First, there are “very difficult line-drawing problems”. How many states would be needed to pinpoint a common thread? “Is it 50 percent? Two-thirds? Three-quarters? Something else?” Second, there is the complication of widely varying state populations. It “seems somewhat anomalous to treat Wyoming’s statute exactly the same as California’s, even though California’s statute applies to m ore than 50 times the population”. Should the justices conduct a weighted survey based on the number of people subject to various permutations of the law? These are all reasonable objections, yet Mr Kedem had trouble coming up with a justification for his own, quite expansive, definition of child abuse. It seems a few of the justices found it rather unfair to put a consensual relationship that is, in Justice Elena Kagan’s words, “really like a freshman in college going out with a junior in college” into a category of “aggravated felony”. Should a young man face deportation from America for such an act? Ms Kagan seemed to hold her nose at the sources Mr Kedem summoned: “a single dictionary definition and some legislative history that even you indicate is sparse”. And the justices teamed up to ridicule the definition, which held that (only) “a parent, guardian, relative, or acquaintance” could be the perpetrator. “If somebody meets someone at a bar and doesn’t even know them”, Justice Stephen Breyer said, pushing on the “acquaintance” requirement, “and gets the person drunk and they go home and they have sex…that would sound much more like sexual abuse of a minor than a senior in college dating and living with a sophomore”.

Reeling from this exchange, Mr Kedem pivoted in his final minutes by pleading for deference. The INA makes “an explicit delegation of interpretive authority”, providing that “the attorney general not only gets to conduct removal proceedings, but gets to render interpretations in those proceedings that are, quote, ‘controlling’”. Administrative agencies, Mr Kedem continued, “are actually quite good at drawing these sorts of lines”. On the other hand, it’s “sort of problematic for courts to do it”. Better to let a “politically accountabl[e]” agency determine what counts as abuse than to entrust the job to unelected judges. In making this final point, Mr Kedem appealed to the so-called Chevron doctrine developed in the mid-1980s: when a statue is ambiguous, the courts should defer to the relevant administrative agency’s interpretation thereof rather than issue a definitive judgment themselves. The late Justice Antonin Scalia was a fan of Chevron deference. Notably, his probable successor, Neil Gorsuch, is not. In an opinion last summer, Mr Gorsuch wrote that Chevron permits agencies “to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power” and to “concentrate federal power” against the wishes of the founders. In Monday’s hearing, Justices Kennedy and Breyer both voiced some hesitation about the breadth of Chevron. When it comes to an agency that has “special expertise in regulating the environment or the forest service or fisheries or nuclear power”, Mr Kennedy said, deference makes sense. But “why does the INS have any expertise in determining the meaning of a criminal statute?” Perhaps the justices are better suited to that task. These glimmers of scepticism about the reach of Chevron—and hints that the justices may employ the “rule of lenity” to give the benefit of the doubt to the defendant—suggest that Mr Esquivel-Quintana has a chance of avoiding deportation. They also hold open the possibility that once Mr Gorsuch takes his seat on the bench, the court may begin a move away from bowing to the discretion of the executive branch in close cases. The implications of such an evolution in the law of administrative agencies are complex and vast, but they point in one curious direction: the possibility that at the dawn of the Trump presidency, courts will begin asserting themselves more in keeping an eye on—and checking—the administration.

Read more here: economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2017/02/deportation-and-law

Sanford Bail Bonds – Supreme Court lets Affco appeal ruling on unlawful lockouts

Source    : ABS-CBN News
By            : Sophie Boot
Category : Bail Bond Sanford , Sanford Bail Bonds

Supreme Court lets Affco appeal ruling on unlawful lockouts

The Supreme Court has given Affco New Zealand leave to appeal a ruling that it unlawfully locked out meat workers when collective bargaining was taking place. In October 2016, the Court of Appeal turned down the meat processor’s application to overturn an Employment Court ruling, saying it was “obvious that Affco’s objective was to undermine or compromise the parallel process of negotiating a collective agreement which was underway with the union” in what amounted to an unlawful lockout.

The Supreme Court today said Affco could appeal on the question of whether the appeal court was correct in finding a breach of the Employment Relations Act (ERA) had occurred when Affco required seasonal workers to enter into new individual employment agreements before commencing work for the 2015/2016 season. The court case is part of a series of legal clashes between Affco and the Meatworkers Union, which has achieved a measure of success in the Employment Court.

Affco was the first under the government’s new employment law to apply for an end to bargaining, under amendments to the ERA which lets firms opt out of multi-employer agreements and removed the duty under good faith bargaining for both sides to reach an agreement. The original case covered workers at Affco’s Rangiuru, Imlay, and Manawatu plants but the company had accepted any finding would cover all eight of its North Island plants.

Read More : news.abs-cbn.com/news/03/08/17/give-women-a-choice-supreme-court-urged-anew-to-lift-hold-order-on-rh-law

Sanford Bail Bonds – Pat Cash slams Roger Federer’s medical timeout as ‘legal cheating’

Source     : ESPN News
By            : AAP
Category : Bail Bond Sanford , Sanford Bail Bonds

Pat Cash slams Roger Federer’s medical timeout as ‘legal cheating’

Roger Federer rejected Pat Cash’s criticism of his fifth-set medical timeout during his victory over Rafael Nadal in the Australian Open final on Sunday night. Cash, working for BBC’s Radio 5 Live, called the lengthy break “legal cheating,” lashing the 18-time Grand Slam winner for his approach.

“It’s cheating and it’s being allowed. It’s legal cheating, but it’s still not right,” the 1987 Wimbledon winner said. Federer also took a timeout during his semifinal success over Stan Wawrinka, although that came after his countryman also needed a medical break.

But the Swiss defended his integrity after the match, saying he was playing through pain and had a track record of avoiding the treatments at all costs. “My leg has been hurting me since the [second-round match vs. Noah Rubin],” he said. “I was able to navigate through the pain. For some reason against Stan I had it from the start on both sides of the groin. I felt my quad midway through the second set already, and the groin started to hurt midway through the third set.

“I just told myself, The rules are there that you can use them. We shouldn’t be using these rules or abusing the system. I think I’ve led the way for 20 years. So I think to be critical there is exaggerating. I’m the last guy to call a medical timeout. I don’t know what he’s talking about.” After losing the fourth set 6-3, Federer recovered to win the final set by the same score. Nadal said he had “no opinion” on Federer’s medical timeout. Federer missed the final six months of last year’s tour after undergoing surgery on an injured knee.

Read More : espn.com/tennis/story/_/id/18579346/pat-cash-slams-roger-federer-medical-legal-cheating

Sanford Bail Bonds – Supreme Court to decide – What level of education do public schools legally owe to students with disabilities

Source     : Washinton Post News
By             : Emma Brown
Category :  Bail Bond Sanford , Sanford Bail Bonds

Supreme Court to decide – What level of education do public schools legally owe to students with disabilities

The U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to hear arguments Wednesday in a dispute over the level of education that public schools must provide to millions of children with disabilities, a case that advocates describe as the most significant special-education issue to reach the high court in three decades.

The question is whether public schools owe disabled children “some” educational benefit — which courts have determined to mean just-above-trivial progress — or whether students legally deserve something more: a substantial, “meaningful” benefit. Lower courts are divided on the question, meaning that disabled children in some states can expect more from their schools than children in other states. Now the Supreme Court will have an opportunity to decide whether a uniform standard should apply nationally. To advocates for children with disabilities, this should not be a difficult decision. Although the Supreme Court upheld the lower standard in 1982, Congress has since amended the federal Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The law — which outlines what states must do in return for receiving federal special-education funds — is meant not just to open the schoolhouse door to disabled children, they argue, but also to make sure that those children get an education that gives them a shot at equal opportunity, independent life and full participation in society.

That means schools must be required to provide students with a real, meaningful education, they argue. “I can’t even believe that this is really a question for the court to wrestle with,” said Gary Mayerson, a civil rights lawyer and board member of Autism Speaks, an advocacy organization. But lawyers for Colorado’s Douglas County School District — the defendant in the case before the court — argue that the “meaningful” benefit standard is ambiguous, not grounded in law and not practical. Judges aren’t proficient in education policy and can’t be expected to decide whether schools are meeting such a vague and variable standard, they argue. The case to be heard Wednesday is Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, brought by the family of a boy diagnosed with autism and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. His conditions complicated his efforts to communicate and socialize, and that left him struggling with phobias and compulsive behaviors.

Endrew F., who goes by Drew, started attending schools in Douglas County — south of Denver — in preschool and began showing an increase in behavioral problems in the second grade, according to court records. He was yelling, crying and dropping to the floor. By fourth grade, the problems had become more frequent and severe; he was kicking walls, banging his head and bolting from the classroom. He went to the bathroom on the floor of a “calming room,” and he was able to escape from the school building and run into the street. His parents said their son made almost no academic or social progress over that period, and they didn’t see a commitment from the district to find a solution. The goals in his Individualized Education Program (IEP) — a legally binding blueprint that laid out the services he would receive and the progress he was expected to make — hardly changed from year to year, according to court records, and there was little written evidence that he was making gains. Drew’s parents withdrew him from public school at the end of fourth grade, in 2010, and placed him in a private school that specialized in educating children with autism. He made progress immediately, they said, achieving IEP goals in months that he had been working on for years.

Read More : washingtonpost.com/local/education/supreme-court-to-decide-what-level-of-education-do-public-schools-legally-owe-to-students-with-disabilities/2017/01/10/3e8e14ca-d690-11e6-9f9f-5cdb4b7f8dd7_story.html

Sanford Bail Bonds – 3 new laws Missouri residents need to know about

Source      : Fox 4KC News
By              : MATT STEWART
Category  :  Bail Bond Sanford , Sanford Bail Bonds

3 new laws Missouri residents need to know about

A new year means some new laws for Missouri residents. In 2017 it is now legal to carry conceal without a permit and fighting in school can now land a student in serious legal trouble. It is still illegal for students and teachers to bring guns into schools – only select teachers designated by the school district as school protection officers can carry a concealed weapon inside. But under the new law, teachers and students to keep a gun inside their car on school grounds – as long as they keep it hidden and don’t take it out.

The new carry conceal also prevents gun owners from taking a weapon into a courthouse, a jail, police station, sports stadium, the airport, a casino or hospital. Supporters believe relaxing the carry conceal laws will help prevent future shootings, while others fear it could lead to more violence. “This is an advantage to people who suddenly pick up a stalker or other dangerous situation, they can carry until they can pick up a class,” Kevin Jamieson, Weston Missouri Shooter’s Alliance said.

“Do I think it would have a huge impact?” Kristy Baughman with the Rose Brooks Center asked. “I am not entirely sure about that. But what I know is any barrier we have to keep in place firearm out of the hands of an abuser, I want to keep it in place.” Another new law says students caught fighting or bullying in school could face felony charges.

In the past, besides facing a suspension from the school, students caught fighting could be charged with a misdemeanor. The punishment for a misdemeanor is light compared to a felony charge because now, students caught fighting could face up to four years in prison. The new law will only apply to students over the age of 17 and right now, it’s too early to tell if prosecutors will charge fighting students with felonies. But they at least now have that tool to protect students from bullies.

Read more : fox4kc.com/2017/01/02/3-new-laws-missouri-residents-need-to-know-about/

Sanford Bail Bonds – House Panel Urges New Law for U.S. Cellphone Surveillance

Source     : Wall Street Journal News
By             : DEVLIN BARRETT
Category : Bail Bond Sanford , Sanford Bail Bonds

House Panel Urges New Law for U.S. Cellphone Surveillance

A House committee has recommended Congress pass a new law to create national standards for how police officers and federal agents use powerful cellphone tracking technology in their investigations. House Oversight and Government Reform Committee staffers issued a bipartisan report Monday, the result of a yearlong probe launched after The Wall Street Journal and others wrote about how investigators were scanning innocent people’s cellphones without search warrants to try to find criminals.

The technology, known as cell-site simulation, essentially mimics a cellphone tower, forcing all the phones in range to identify themselves, even if it means those phones drop calls or otherwise have their service disrupted. Such devices have a variety of brand names or nicknames, including dirtbox, Stingray and Hailstorm. The Journal reported in 2014 that the U.S. Marshals used such devices in small Cessna airplanes around the country to hunt for fugitives. From the air, those devices are capable of scanning tens of thousands of phones at a time in order to hunt for a single suspect’s phone. The Journal also reported the Marshals developed the technology with help from the Central Intelligence Agency. The Marshals have since used the airborne devices in conducting armed raids on drug suspects in Mexico.

The committee, led by chairman Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R., Utah) and ranking member Rep. Elijah Cummings (D., Md.), launched its investigation in the wake of those reports and others. Five months later, the Justice Department announced it was revising policies on use of the technology by its investigative agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Marshals. As part of the new guidelines, all Justice Department agencies now have to get a warrant from a judge before using such devices, authorities said, though there are some exceptions. “Documents and information obtained by the committee confirmed varying standards for employing cell-site simulation devices among federal, state, and local law enforcement,’’ the report concluded. For years, the federal government and many states didn’t require a search warrant to deploy such a device, and some states still don’t.

The committee found that the Justice Department has 310 such devices, and the Department of Homeland Security has 124 of them. Such technologies, the report concluded, “represent a valuable law enforcement tool, but their domestic use has obvious and serious implications for citizens’ Constitutional rights…There must be a universal and well-understood standard by which these technologies are deployed.’’

A Justice Department spokesman said policy changes made last year “enhanced transparency and accountability, improved training and supervision, established a higher and more consistent legal standard and increased privacy protections in relation to law enforcement’s use of this critical technology.” The report calls for Congress to create clear rules for how the government—and private entities—use such devices. Until that happens, the committee said, the Justice Department and DHS shouldn’t fund such technology for local police unless those police agencies agree to certain privacy standards. The panel also urged authorities to stop hiding facts about the devices from judges and courts trying to weigh the rights of suspects.

Read More : wsj.com/articles/house-panel-urges-new-law-for-u-s-cellphone-surveillance-1482178238

Sanford Bail Bond – Abortion Law Changes and Legal Implications

Source     : WYSO News
By             : JERRY KENNEY
Category :  Bail Bond Sanford , Sanford Bail Bond

Abortion Law Changes and Legal Implications

Ohio Governor John Kasich Tuesday took action on two bills restricting abortion in the state. One measure, known as the heartbeat bill, would have banned abortions at a fetus’ first detectable heartbeat, which could come as early as six weeks for some women, who may not yet realize they are pregnant.

The governor vetoed that bill, saying it would never survive a court challenge and would cost taxpayers thousands of dollars.

But Kasich did sign a second bill into law outlawing abortions after 20 weeks with no exceptions for rape or incest. Existing Ohio law bans abortions after 24 weeks. For Politics Ohio, WYSO’s Jerry Kenney spoke with Robert Vaughn, assistant professor of criminology at Cedarville University, about how the 20-week bill changes the current abortion law in Ohio and what potential legal challenges may lie ahead.

Read More : wyso.org/post/politics-ohio-abortion-law-changes-and-legal-implications#stream/0